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In his lucid and helpful reply, Chris Drain (2021) clarifies some of his views and aims and 
offers pertinent criticisms of my own. Drain refocuses my forays into Pittsburgh 
Hegelianism onto Vygotsky’s own thought. He rightly notes that Brandom’s account of 
deontic scorekeeping tells us nothing about phylogenesis. Sellars too has little to say about 
the origins of language and social practice and I would endorse the projects of those who 
turn to Tomasello to fill such gaps (Koons 2018). However, I still do not think Drain has got 
Vygotsky’s Hegel right. I do not think one can substitute “Hegelian” for “Janetian”, and I 
hope to show why this matters. 
 
Drain also objects to my characterization of Tomasello as Cartesian. There is of course a 
long line of philosophers from Deleuze to Dennett charging all those who fall across their 
path with covert Cartesianism. I will not besmirch this venerable custom here. In my reply I 
contrast the Hegelian-Marxist approach to language of Vygotsky with the Cartesian 
approach of Tomasello. I conclude by suggesting some active research programmes which 
overcome this Cartesiansim while following the trajectories of Vygotsky’s own project. 
 
A Brief Note on Hegel 
 
Drain shares a Vygotsky passage which I admit sounds like Kojève’s Hegel. But here is one 
area where I would insist on the convergence between Vygotsky and the Pittsburgh 
Hegelians: for both, words only have the meanings they do because of their function in a 
wider system. It is true that Vygotsky refers to the “slave and overseer” and to “submission”, 
but what else does he mean by these words? As I suggested in my last piece, I think these 
designations illustrate something about the structure of concept development. We can tell 
this is not a Nietzschean story of social oppression and resentment because it is the 
individual who is both the overseer and the slave—and through successive reconstructive 
iterations. I will try to lay out what this means for Vygotsky in subsequent sections. 
 
Is Vygotsky a Janetian? 
 
Following Van der Veer and Valsiner (1988) Drain suggests that there are significant 
parallels between the work of Vygotsky and Pierre Janet, particularly in terms of the latter’s 
“command-origin” theory of language. I will use Van der Veer and Valsiner as a foil to 
unpack what is at stake here.1 Van der Veer and Valsiner suggest that Janet is the source for 
Vygotsky’s general genetic law of development. Though Van der Veer and Valsiner concede 
that Vygotsky rarely cites Janet, they suggest that the only plausible explanations for the 
similarity in their descriptions of sociogenesis are: 
 
a) that Vygotsky was directly influenced by Janet, or  
b) that they shared a common influence in Baldwin or Royce.  
 
1 While Van Der Veer and Valsiner try to promote Janet, I take it Drain views the links to Vygotsky as 
limitations. I am ultimately on Drain’s side here. Anyone who wants to rehabilitate Janet has the corpus of Ian 









Van der Veer and Valsiner suggest there is no evidence for b) and that therefore a) is true. 
There are problems with this argument. First, here is Vygotsky (1997) in Volume 4 of his 
collected works: 
 
Initially, the sign is always a means of social connection, a means of affecting 
others, and only later does it become a means of affecting oneself. Many 
actual connections and dependences that are formed in this way have been 
explained in psychology. For example, we might point to the circumstance 
noted by J. Baldwin that has at present been developed in Piaget’s studies. 
Research has demonstrated that there undoubtedly is a genetic connection 
between the child’s argument; and his reflections. The very logic of the child 
confirms the basis of this. Conclusions appear initially in arguments among 
children and only later are they internalized by the child himself, linked to 
how his personality is manifested (103). 
 
Vygotsky makes this point again some pages later (196), stressing the importance of argument 
in Baldwin’s understanding of this process. Argument and drama, as I tried to show in my 
last piece, are crucial to Vygotsky’s understanding of concept development, and are not 
something he found in Janet. 
 
Second, if he had such a profound influence, why did Vygotsky extensively discuss Ribot, 
Freud and Piaget but not Janet? Vygotsky makes the genealogy of his thought clear in many 
of his writings and Janet hardly features there. Perhaps it is more of that sourly dissonant 
misanthropy and Vygotsky wanted to keep the close connection under wraps? But Vygotsky 
openly credits Janet as a source for his genetic law and yet, with the recent publication of 
Vygotsky’s notebooks, Janet is still rarely mentioned. I suggest this is because Vygotsky liked 
Janet’s formulation of this law but otherwise found his views of limited interest. Again, I’d 
emphasize that it is not about the words themselves but their function in a wider system. 
 
Van der Veer and Valsiner quote Janet: 
 
According to the law that I discussed with you… every individual repeats in 
himself the social conducts… The child creates his individuality because one 
always mentions him in the same way and because one’s behavior towards 
him has a certain unity. 
 
And it’s true, for Vygotsky too, the individual “repeats in himself the social conducts”, but 
does Vygotsky think this is “because one always mentions him in the same way…”? It’s clear 
Janet is talking about stimulus and response learning. As Van Der Veer and Valsiner quote: 
“Our actions are determined by those two great sources: the stimulations that come from the 
external word and the stimulations that come from society”. I’d like to see where Vygotsky 
speaks of such behavioural conditioning. Here is a longer passage from Janet (1929): 
 
Social conduct is conduct which has its starting point in a kind of stimulation 
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us, which resemble us to a considerable extent... Social behaviours are 
therefore behaviours determined by particular living beings. These conduits 
are external conduits, just like the conduits towards a chair or towards a 
sidewalk. They are behaviours determined by objects (113). 
 
It is clear how we get from here to the “command-origin” account of language that worries 
Drain: speech here is a matter of direction towards affordances. But this is just Pavlov’s 
theory of language as a “second signal system” (Windholz 1990). Indeed, Janet acknowledges 
his debt to Pavlov (op. cit, 46). This would be a short reply if we only needed to find 
critiques of Pavlov in Vygotsky. I’ll just note one of Vygotsky’s (1999) criticisms of Pavlov’s 
disciples which could as easily apply to Janet’s version of sociogenesis: 
 
The very significance of social experience in this case is understood 
exclusively from the point of view of the presence of adequate models that 
the child finds in his environment … a series of stereotypic motor formulas, 
a series of motor patterns that the child uses in solving the problem (8). 
 
Such Pavlovian accounts completely miss the cultural-historical character of the social; they 
describe processes that are “mechanistic” and do not participate in the work of the intellect. 
So, while it is true that both Vygotsky and Janet have a theory of the “social”, what they 
mean by this word is entirely different.2 Let’s look at Vygotsky’s (1997) general genetic law 
again: 
 
Every function in the cultural development of the child appears on the stage 
twice, in two planes, first, the social, then the psychological, first between 
people as an intermental category, then within the child as an intramental 
category (106, italics mine). 
 
Granted, initial material for Vygotsky’s law came from Janet, but there are clear divergences 
in how Janet (1929) and Vygotsky understand and use this law: 
 
… you start with others and then apply to yourself what you have thought 
about others. This is sometimes true, sometimes it is exaggerated. I think we 
can say more simply that the two things are done at the same time and in the 
same way, we build others and we build ourselves, simultaneously. 
Sometimes one precedes a little, sometimes the other precedes. We start by 
constructing some ideas in ourselves, then we apply them to others, or, 




2 Janet also speaks of higher psychological functions but, following Condillac, it is feelings/sensations that 
constitute these for him. The social develops our personality because we come to share certain sensations; love 








Most of Janet’s writings consist of descriptions of empirical findings and here as elsewhere 
he criticises philosophers like William James through his own common-sense observations 
rather than on any rigorous philosophical basis. Vygotsky (2012, 171) appropriates this 
passage but does not agree with its conclusion.  
 
Finally, what is strange about Van der Veer and Valsiner’s article is that nowhere do they 
mention that Janet was preceded by Marx. Vygotsky found in Baldwin and Janet, expressed 
in psychological language, something already very familiar to him in the thought of Marx and 
Engels (1996): that “man first sees and recognises himself in other men.” That is not to say 
that Janet’s work is entirely without merit. Indeed, I will argue that it offers something that is 
missing in Tomasello. 
 
Not Janet, But Janus 
 
A fierce battle raged in French philosophy of the 1930s. On the one side was Hegel and on 
the other was Pierre Janet’s close friend and confidante, Henri Bergson. Philosophers picked 
a side and developed their own views along these battle lines. Vygotsky was familiar with 
Minkowski’s work showing the strong influence of Bergson on Janet and at one point 
Vygotsky refers to Janet as offering additional evidence for aspects of Bergson’s philosophy 
(Zavershneva and van der Veer 2018, 137). Vygotsky thinks that Bergson and Janet were 
partially right about the role of “the word in volition” (118). 
 
In his notebooks, Vygotsky plays Bergson and Hegel off against each-other to explore 
dimensions of language use. I do not have the space to explain Bergson’s theories and 
Vygotsky’s engagement with them here, so, in Bergsonian fashion, I will instead provide an 
image. A cliff face can be said to contain memory of the sea. As each wave hits the cliff, the 
cliff face as an image of the sea is altered. It represents the sea waves not in linear sequence 
but in quality and intensity. The cliff face is an image of both the sea’s past and of its future, 
as each new wave rushes into the crevices formed by past trysts of rock and water. 
 
Vygotsky suggests that if some aspects of Bergson’s idealism were inverted, one could 
appreciate his attempts to naturalize concepts. Vygotsky agrees with Bergson that “word 
organizes a number of motor processes and elementary processes” (135) but criticizes 
Bergson for limiting his account to this kind of habituation. For Vygotsky, Bergson cannot 
distinguish between the effect of a word on thinking and the effect of hydrochloric acid on 
limestone (147); he does not appreciate the Hegelian dimensions of words, as intersubjective 
cultural-historical functions. 
 
Vygotsky uses a psychoanalytic example to criticize Bergson. A traumatic event can alter 
one’s mind at the level of the unconscious and motor habits, in ways that can perhaps 
account for the repetition of the trauma in neurosis, but for me to experience “this” as an 
image of that traumatic event Vygotsky suggests we need language in its discursive form 
(137). This is a Hegelian argument against Bergson but could equally be a Freudian argument 
against Janet. According to Janet the unconscious is a personality disorder: a weakening of 
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because for Janet the personality is a loose assemblage of multiplicities. Vygotsky thinks that 
Bergson and Janet are wrong to assume we intuit multiplicities of particulars and then 
generalize from them. For Vygotsky, we need to generalize before we can grasp particulars.  
 
Whatever his limitations, Janet was part of an important intellectual milieu which would give 
rise to thinkers like Merleau-Ponty. Bergson, Janet and James were among the first to bring 
to attention the role of proprioception, embodiment and volition to psychology. They were 
progenitors of what is today called enactivism (Gallagher 2020). Meanwhile, many 
contemporary enactivists have recruited Vygotsky to their cause (Baggs and Chemero 2019, 
van den Herik 2018, Shvarts and Abrahamson 2019). Di Paolo, Cuffari and De Jaegher draw 
on Vygotsky as well as Ilyenkov to provide a unique dialectical enactivist account of language 
development. They translate the kind of command and constraint structure that worries 
Drain into descriptions of dynamic biological systems:3  
 
Our view of symbolizing is that of an operation that linguistic bodies 
perform that is at once concrete and often spontaneous as well as embedded 
in the sedimented repertoires of previous operations of symbolizing. 
Symbols act as jointly used and created constraints that bring forth virtual 
flows in participatory sense-making. Speaking in dynamical terms, symbols 
act as metastable emergent constraints that modulate the processes of social 
interaction and mutually interlock with other symbols. (Di Paolo, Cuffari, 
and De Jaegher 2018, sec. 11.3) 
 
Vygotsky cannot be called a traditional enactivist because he does not think meaning is 
reducible to the affective-volitional plane. He believes consciousness is composed of 
“dynamic-semantic systems” (Zavershneva and van der Veer 2018, xvii). Vygotsky wants to 
see words as both natural objects in the world, embedded in habits and causes, and as a part 
of discursive practices. Words as natural objects reify affective-volitional relations to things in 
the world (489) but as discursive functions they allow us to find meaning and give justifications 
(183). Sellars (1979) calls this the “Janus-faced character of languagings as belonging to both 
the causal order and the order of reasons”.  
 
For Vygotsky, while developmentally earlier functions can be characterized in terms of loops 
of perception and volition, the development of understanding depends on the capacity to be 
“oriented in the complex internal space that might be called a system of [sign] relations” 
(1997, 142). We can interpret this in terms of what Brandom and McDowell, following 
Sellars, have called “the space of reasons” (Derry 2013, 73). Reason and affect are never 




3 Though Vygotsky drops the term “command” after 1931, the account here is consistent with his broader 








Back to Baldwin 
 
In his magnum opus on the phylogenesis of language, Terrence Deacon traces a long path 
through biology, anthropology, and neuroscience, and ending with Vygotsky’s general 
genetic law of development. Deacon follows this path not via Janet but Baldwin. According 
to Deacon (1998, 336), it is language itself which exerted the pressure necessary for humans 
to develop language capacities. Primitive language use (perhaps derived from ritual gestures) 
gave societies an evolutionary advantage, and this culturally transmitted advantage was 
eventually “centralized” in our biology. I do not have space to outline Baldwinian evolution 
here, but here is a good gloss on it: 
 
We began our research with a psychological analysis of several forms of 
behavior that are found, not frequently it is true, in everyday, common life 
and are thus known to everyone, but are also to a high degree complex, 
historical formations of the earliest epochs in the mental development of 
man. These techniques or methods of behavior, arising stereotypically in 
given situations, represent virtual, solidified, petrified, crystallized 
psychological forms that arose in remote times at the most primitive stages 
of cultural development of man and in a remarkable way were preserved in 
the form of historical survivors in a petrified and in a living state in the 
behavior of modern man (Vygotsky 1997, 38). 
 
For Deacon as for Vygotsky, the key to understanding the development of language is sign 
mediation. Far from having a simplistic Janetian theory of signs, Vygotsky has a multi-stage 




When a child is developing their ability to use signs, what is important is not the correlation 
between signifier and signified but the expression of a move in a broader activity or language 
game. 
 
[A] child wanted to show in a drawing how it gets dark when the curtains are 
closed and he made a forceful line down on the board as if he was drawing a 
window shade. The drawing movement did not signify a cord, but expressed 
specifically the movement of drawing a curtain (Vygotsky 1999, 134). 
 
The movement here is iconic i.e. it bears some spaciotemporal isomorphy with what it is 
meant to represent, though already refracted through social practice. Vygotsky suggests that 
even the drawing of a picture should first be understood in terms of discursive functions 
rather than representations. 
Indexical 
 
4 Something like the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness are also present in Vygotsky via his use of 
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As the child develops mastery in symbolic activity, she moves from expressing intentions in 
direct action to enacting a “plan of action”, for example in assigning different household 
objects to function as different buildings of a town. A clock can represent a pharmacy for a 
child not because it looks like a pharmacy but because it is able to embody the child’s 
intentions in pretend play e.g., she can walk the doll from the clock tower to the pharmacy 
or talk about different numbers on the clock as different medicines. At this stage, the plan is 
particular to and shaped through the situated activity (136). The child relies on indexical 
relations between the object of their activity and the mediating artifact. According to Deacon 
this is where we leave behind our primate neighbours (and, I’d argue, Janet). A vervet 
monkey barking in response to a leopard does not mean anything else by its call (Bickerton 





Finally, the plans of action are reified or crystalized in the object. In new situations the children 
can go and grab the clock to mean “pharmacy” though the connection to the concrete 
activity through which it was baptised a “pharmacy” may be forgotten. Here, the external 
sign is internalized, so that a stick acquires the seemingly inherent affordances that make it 
an appropriate horse in various role plays, even to new players. The objects of play, like 
words, are Janus-faced: “In play, real properties of the thing and its symbolic significance 
exhibit a complex structural interaction” (Vygotsky 1999, 9). Vygotsky suggests that this is 
also what happens in language learning. Words acquire functional roles for us through this 
multi-staged process of enculturation. As Sellars (1960) suggests, such practice-centred 
approaches avoid the Cartesian trap of having to account for the appearance of different 
“mental contents”. 
 
There is nothing inherent either about objects or thoughts which makes them iconic rather 
than indexical or symbolic. Rather, the distinction depends on the interpretative activity in 
which the sign functions. What is unique about humans is the way in which social activity 
restructures all three levels of signification. So that, for a human child, the range of icons and 
indices on which symbols can rely (sic. intentionality) is indefinitely extended.  
 
Vygotsky suggests that embodied actions like the miming of drawing a curtain can be 
thought of as analogous to but developmentally earlier than full-fledged language use.  
Vygotsky does not agree with Bergson that a representation is something that appears to 
intuition and is then corrupted by language. That a picture of a doll is representing her doll is 
something Vygotsky suggests the child must learn; it is not given by the picture itself (op. 
cit., 135). Nelson Goodman (1976) gives another example. When ethnographers showed 
people living in cultures with no experience of photography a photograph of their own 
house or village, they could not recognise them in the photo. We do not start with 









Enculturation allows a child to orient herself in her environment using icons and indices 
before she has full grasp of concepts that supervene on these icons in her society. The 
dynamic or affective-volitional plane is something we share with other animals, but behaviour on 
this plane is limited to iconic and indexical interpretation. Humans, meanwhile, are at home 
in the semantic plane, which is a unique aspect of the ecological niche we have constructed. 
Semantic activity depends on and is a species of affective-volitional activity, but semantic 
activity has no outer boundary, thus “the higher functions permeate the lower and reform all 
of them, even the deepest layers of behaviour” (Vygotsky 1999, 44). 
 
Is Tomasello a Cartesian? 
 
The few times Tomasello mentions the body in the book he sees as the culmination of his 
work, Becoming Human, it is generally to describe someone observing their own or an other’s 
body (Tomasello 2019, 48, 279, 282). As Di Paolo, Cuffari and De Jaegher suggest, 
Tomasello has inherited the Cartesianism of traditional cognitivist psychology in thinking of 
language in purely informational terms: Tomasello does not seem to appreciate the ways in 
which the embodied materiality of language can shape human development in ontogenesis 
and phylogenesis, via the fragile dynamics of consciousness (Di Paolo, Cuffari, and De 
Jaegher 2018, 200). 
 
Some of Tomasello’s most important findings have arguably been on the role of joint 
attention in sociogenesis. But Tomasello also suggests that all joint attention relies on us 
having shared intentional states. It is here that I think he is most Cartesian (in ways that remind 
me of Searle). What are intentional states and how can we share them? Do we need another 
intentional state to know if we’re sharing them correctly? Why not just say that when we see 
a chess piece on the board what we share is the knight right there in front of us, as it appears 
in our activity? As Hegel argued, we do not need to worry about the correlation between a 
noumenal realm and mental phenomena because we are already dealing with a world of 
publicly available things. Ilyenkov called this the ideal (Ilyenkov 1977). 
 
Like Sellars (Seibt 2009), Vygotsky thought that when we speak we are literally thinking out 
loud: our thoughts are in our words and we are sharing our thoughts in the conversation. 
When I play the trumpet, my thoughts and intentions are in the playing; as I play, I respond 
to the trumpet and perhaps to those I play with, not to intentional states in my head. What 
happens over our individual and collective history is that some signs are crystallized and 
function as habits. As humans we can also break off from the affordances affecting us to 
improvise and create something new (Zavershneva and van der Veer 2018, 386; Vygotsky 
2004). Plans, shared or otherwise, are such crystallizations; play is their obverse. 
 
We can describe the transitions here in terms of higher and lower grade normativity (Seibt 2009). 
We do no not need to posit, along with Tomasello, that we come into this world hardwired 
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concepts of mutual respect, equality and trust (191),5 there are lower grade more local and 
iconic/indexical responses that can follow the patterns of these higher grade rule systems 
(Beisecker 2013).6 I’d argue Tomasello rejects this option because he does not appreciate the 
Janus-faced character of signs. Considering whether iconicity plays a role in symbolic 
gestures, Tomasello (2009) concludes that “symbolic gestures are the same as spoken 
symbols … in being only conventionally connected to their intended referents” (34-35). But 
why must these options be mutually exclusive?  
 
To exclusively privilege coherence with social convention leaves us, as McDowell 
memorably said of Davidson, with frictionless spinning in a void. The evidence Tomasello 
offers for this conclusion presupposes the intentional state framing. He suggests, “in 
experiments, 18-month-olds are unable to use iconicity to understand an adult’s specific 
communicative intention”—but why assume they should? Secondly, he claims that “in the 
earliest stages, deaf children learning sign language are not helped by the iconicity of many 
sign language signs”, and we may infer that “arbitrary gestures” would have done just as well. 
But this seems like a selective reading, overlooking the many ways in which sign language is 
clearly characterized by iconicity (Padden et al. 2013; Thompson et al. 2012).  
 
The Vygotsky-inspired experiments of the Zagorsk Children’s Home for the Death and 
Blind show that we do not need to put conventions and intentions on one side and the 
resistance of matter on the other (Ilyenkov 2007). That signs and gestures are learned 
through enculturation does not mean that they are immaterial.7 If the Vygotskian account 
later expanded by Ilyenkov is right, the process by which a thing comes to stand for another 
thing relies not on prior mental abstraction but dynamic isomorphy with wider concrete 
activity systems.  
 
In the Beginning was the Deed 
 
By way of a conclusion, I come to the work of the developmental psychologists Racine and 
Carpendale. Racine and Carpendale tie up many of the trajectories I have sketched while 
actively reinterpreting Tomasello’s findings (Racine and Carpendale 2007 a, b, c). Racine and 
Carpendale’s central criticism of Tomasello can be summarized in their claim that his 
theorization of child development falls foul of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. By 
presupposing intentional states prior to socialization, Tomasello is committed to a circular 
notion of inner labelling of mental contents. An intention exists “embedded in its situation”: 
 
In their interactions with others, children do not observe a pattern of activity 
and then go about computing the underlying meaning; children instead come 
 
5 As Alasdair Macintyre has argued, you cannot learn “good” in the abstract. Knowing what a good or fair 
number of cookies is presupposes knowing what cookies are at some level (MacIntyre 2013).  
6 This is the picture of social practice Vygotsky gives in his concept of the zone of proximal development (Zaretsky 
2021). 
7 The complex dynamics here were explored in Marx’s analysis of commodities (Ilyenkov 2008, 88) and Sellars’ 








to see psychological concepts directly in such patterns of activity (Racine and 
Carpendale 2007a).  
 
This conclusion is one we find in the work of Ilyenkov and others following in Vygotsky’s 
footsteps (Ilyenkov 1974). It is a view Siyaves Azeri (2021) explores more fully in his last 
reply to Drain. 
 
As Racine and Carpendale (2007a) argue, “words derive their meanings from the role they 
play in patterns of human action and interaction; language is the refinement that gives us the 
ability to make finer distinctions.” What Vygotsky’s explorations help to bring into sharper 
relief is the Janus-faced nature of language development as involving affective-volitional 
systems entwined in our environment and their dialectical unity with cultural-historical 
systems constituting our conceptual space.8 
 
This unity is embodied in the sign. 
 
There is a genetic, but not a logical, contradiction between the claim that 
higher mental functions, an inseparable part of which is the use of signs, arise 
in the process of cooperation and social intercourse, and the other claim that 
these functions develop from primitive roots on a base of lower or 
elementary functions, that is, a contradiction between the sociogenesis of 




One decidedly Hegelian-Marxist aspect of Vygotsky’s work is his approach to reading. 
Playing off a plethora of thinkers against each-other, he reads each seriously and finds what 
is valuable to the problem at hand, synthesizing their ideas into a qualitatively new form. 
 
In his reply Drain characterized Vygotsky as “Janetian”, only then to reject both. I have 
argued that this attempt to poison the well is unwarranted. The advantage of aligning 
Vygotsky with Baldwin instead of Janet is not just that Baldwin is a more coherent thinker, 
but that Baldwinian evolution is more resonant with the explicit Marxist orientation of 
Vygotsky and his followers. The reading of Baldwinian evolution advanced by Deacon 
brings this work within reach of Engels and the theory of human nature so important to 
Vygotsky.9 
 
While both Deacon and Tomasello describe the ratchetting effect of human culture, for 
Deacon it is shared symbols and not shared intentions that are key here. In our phylogenesis, 
it is not beliefs and intentions that make a difference but customs and practices. If I am born 
in a culture with certain marriage customs, it is not that I share intentions with others in my 
 
8 I’d argue that Vygotsky coined the term “word-meaning” to signal this dialectic. 
9 Deacon, personal communication. He also suggests external constrains help to solve problems of downward 
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culture but that this is what marriage actually is as an object in my world, about which I may 
then form beliefs (Lipatov, Brown, and Feldman 2011). As Racine & Carpendale have 
argued, we can appreciate Tomasello’s many innovations while rejecting some of his 
mentalistic language and giving due emphasis to embodiment.  
 
There is much I agree with and many points I’ve not done justice to in Drain’s critique, but I 
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